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Continuities and Change: the Law Commission and Sexual Violence 
 
Sexual violence continues to be a serious issue for Indian women. The latest crime 
statistics released by the Home Ministry’s National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB, 
2014) state that 93 women are raped every day in the country. The number of reported 
rapes a day has increased nearly by 700% per cent since 1971 — when such cases 
were first recorded by the NCRB. Recent statistics released by the Delhi police 
suggest that in over 95% of all recorded cases of sexual violence, the accused was 
either a family member or known to the victim (Iqbal, 2014). However this statistic 
does not include incidents of rape within marriage, as that is not classified as a crime. 
Research has also indicated the continuum between sexual and domestic violence in 
the home, and outside, suggesting that one form of violence may feed into, exacerbate 
and legitimise other forms of abuse (Brownmiller, 1974; Kelly, 1988) 
 
In cases of non familial rapes, structural factors such as caste, community and class 
status can contribute to sexual violence, and have an impact on women’s ability to 
access the criminal justice system. Women from working class, minority or ‘lower’ 
caste Dalit groups are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence, and this can 
sometimes be in the context of communal riots, civil unrest, or conflict situations. 
Dalit women are very vulnerable to sexual violence from upper caste men (NCRB, 
2007). Further, women from working class and caste backgrounds are less likely to 
get justice from the criminal justice system. A study conducted by People’s Union for 
Democratic Rights (PUDR), a Delhi based civil liberties group, looked at ten cases of 
rapes by police personnel and revealed that in most cases, the victim was a working 
class woman. In almost all cases, the accused was acquitted; some have been 
reinstated in their old posts (People’s Union for Democratic Rights, 1994). 
Communalisation and the social and economic marginalization of Muslims in post 
independence India has resulted in sexual assaults perpetrated on Muslim women, as 
was apparent in the anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002 (Hameed et al 2002).  
 
Sexual violence and rape have, therefore, been an important site of feminist activism, 
and as noted elsewhere, law and legal change has remained a central arena of feminist 
intervention in the area of violence against women, with women’s organisations often 
simultaneously agitating against state ineptitude and/or complicity; and lobbying and 
working with the State towards legal reform (Gangoli, 2007; Gangoli and Rew, 2014). 
Within these dynamics, the role of the Law Commission is both significant, as it is a 
body that both represents State interests, but also perhaps stands outside it, and may 
be seen as less impervious and more open to feminist interventions than, for instance, 
the parliament or the police.  
 
This paper is concerned with the role of the Law Commission in India regarding 
sexual violence and rape. The Law Commission reports in 1980, 2003 and 2013 all 
played an important role in the framing of the rape law, though as we will see there 
was often a mismatch between the Law Commission and the law (Gangoli, 2007, 
2011). The paper will reflect on the shifts and continuities in Law Commission 
reports on sexual violence focussing on the reports on rape in 1980 and the Justice 
Verma Commission report of 2013. We are aware that there is a difference between 
the wider executive status of the Law Commission and the Justice Verma 
Commission. The Law Commission as we understand it is an executive body and is 
established by order of the Government of India, and is made up of legal experts who 
follow the mandate of the government to work towards legal reforms on a range of 
matters and issues. It serves as an advisory body to the Ministry of Law and Justice. 
The Verma Commission was a three member body made up of  Justice J.S. Verma, 
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Leila Seth, former judge of the 
High Court and Gopal Subramanium, former Solicitor General of India, and  was 
commissioned by the Prime Minister in December 2012 to recommend amendments 
to the Criminal Law ‘so as to provide for quicker trial and enhanced punishment for 
criminals accused of committing sexual assault against women’ (PRS website). It is 
not a Law Commission in the strictest use of the term, as it was constituted in 
response to a specific event (the 2012 Delhi rape case), was a smaller body and had a 
number of organisations and individuals deposing and providing evidence to it 
However for the purposes of this paper, we are treating the Justice Verma 
Commission as a Law Commission due to the similar advisory impact it had on the 
new law constituted in 2013. 
 
 
More specifically, we are concerned with exploring two areas of enquiry. First, we 
seek to understand how the Indian women’s movement has engaged with Law 
Commissions over these years. Second, we aim to trace the conceptual continuities 
and changes that have occurred between the1980 and 2013 reports.  
 
The first part of the paper discusses the context of the two reports: the 1980 report 
following feminist intervention regarding the Mathura rape case judgement; and the 
2013 report following feminist and wider social movements responses to the 2012 
rape and murder case of a 23 year old student in New Delhi. The second part of the 
paper unpacks the conceptual continuities and changes in which sexual violence has 
been constructed within these two reports, and how feminist politics affected the 
content and discussion in these reports. We conclude by reflecting on the links 
between feminism, sexual violence and  Law Commissions within the wider context 
of Indian politics and the State.  
 
The theoretical framework used for this paper draws on Richard Freeman’s (2009) 
notion of ‘translation’ where “some kinds of association or translation are legitimated 
and authorised just as others are excluded or denied” (pp.11), and meanings are 
constantly reassigned. Mulvihill (2015) points out that this authorisation is based on 
contestations around power, therefore policy makers have more or less variable power 
in terms of gender and class  to redefine the meanings of how law and policy is 
shaped and implemented. In this instance, translation implies a movement/s of 
meaning on rape and justice both in historical terms, from the 1980 Law Commission 
Report to the one released in 2013- and from expert opinion embodied in the reports 
to its formalisation in law. This points to the fact that, ‘the central activity of law is 
the reading of texts - cases, statutes, regulations - and their imperfect reproduction and 
arrangement  (pp. 10) where justice is always partial and, in this case, is an imperfect 
political and social compromise between recommendation and law making.   
Section 1 
The changing contexts: 1980 and 2013 
 
Three cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s created a public debate around the issue 
of rape, and fed into the newly emerging feminist movement in India. This movement 
created a nationwide campaign on the issue of rape which led to amendments to the 
rape law in 1983. The first case was that of Rameezabee, a Muslim working class 
woman from Hyderabad. In April 1978, she and her husband were arrested by the 
police for ‘loitering’ when they were returning from a late night visit to the cinema. 
The police demanded a fine. The husband went home to bring the money. During his 
absence, Rameezabee was raped by three police men. When the husband returned, he 
was beaten to death by the police. Rameezabee was prosecuted for enticing minor 
girls into prostitution. She was convicted on this charge, and was subsequently 
released on probation for a year (Farooqi, 1984). 
 
The second case was that of Mathura, a tribal agricultural labourer from Maharashtra, 
aged around 14-16 years. She developed a relationship with Ashok, the cousin of 
Nushi, her employer. Ashok and Mathura decided to get married. On March 26th 
1972, her brother, Gama complained to the local police that Mathura had been 
kidnapped by Nushi and Ashok. Nushi, Ashok, Mathura and Gama were brought to 
the Police Station for questioning, and to record their statements. At 10:30 p.m., when 
they were leaving the police station, the head constable, Tukaram, and constable 
Ganpat held Mathura back. She was subjected to rape by Ganpat, and an attempted 
rape by Tukaram. Mathura came out of the police station and announced to the crowd 
outside that she had been raped. The crowd surrounded the station, and exerted 
enough pressure to ensure that a case of rape was registered.  
 
While the Sessions Court acquitted the accused, the Bombay High Court reversed the 
judgment, and convicted and sentenced Tukaram and Ganpat for rape. The Court held 
that since the police were strangers to Mathura, it was unlikely that “she would make 
any overtures or invite the accused to satisfy her sexual desires.” Justice Koshal, of 
The Supreme Court, reversed the High Court judgment. According to the judge, as 
there were no injuries shown in the medical report, the story of “stiff resistance 
having been put up by the girl is all false” and the alleged intercourse was a “peaceful 
affair”. Justice Koshal dismissed Mathura’s testimony that she had raised an alarm, 
and further held that under Section 375 IPC, only the ‘fear of death or hurt’ could 
vitiate consent for sexual intercourse, and further stated that there was no such finding 
(cited in Dhagamwar, 1992: p 253)  
 
The third case was that of Maya Tyagi, a middle class, young woman, who on 18th 
July 1980, was driving to her parents house in Haryana. The car broke down on the 
way, and while it was being repaired a policeman in civilian dress tried to molest 
Maya and was beaten up by her husband. The policeman returned with a contingent of 
policemen. The police opened fire, and shot her husband dead. Maya Tyagi was 
dragged out from her car, beaten, stripped and paraded through the town. She was 
finally taken to the police station, where she was raped by the police. She was charged 
with being a dacoit (armed robber), and subsequently released on bail. 
 
The three cases described above have several points in common. In all three cases, the 
victims were innocent of having committed any crime. Hence, the action of the police 
in holding them in custody was in itself illegal. Rameezabee and Mathura were 
socially and economically disadvantaged. Rameezabee was a Muslim and Mathura a 
tribal woman. In both these cases, their testimony was suspected. Mathura was held to 
be a “shocking liar” as she was not a virgin prior to the rape, and had a lover. As she 
was “habituated to sex”, the judge concluded that she had consented to sexual 
intercourse with the accused. In two of the three cases, the woman was re-victimised 
by having false cases filed against them — Rameezabee was convicted of procuring 
minor girls into prostitution, and it was further alleged that her marriage was illegal, 
and she was sexually promiscuous. Maya Tyagi was accused of being a dacoit. 
Mathura was castigated by the Supreme Court of indulging in premarital sex and 
lying. 
 
The three cases, both individually and collectively, led to a major campaign on the 
issue of rape in custody.  Following the assault on Rameezabee, there was public 
protest in the city of Hyderabad (Kannabiran, 1996, 120). However, the accused were 
acquitted by the Sessions Court on the grounds of rape, and were instead admonished 
for wrongful confinement. The Mathura case led to a major nation wide campaign on 
the issue of custodial rape, following the open letter written in September 1979 by 
four law teachers — Upendra Baxi, Lotika Sarkar, Vasudha Dhagamwar and 
Raghunath Kelkar — to the Chief Justice of India. The Maya Tyagi case was 
discussed in the Lok Sabha (House of Parliament) on over four days, following which 
a judicial inquiry was initiated by the Uttar Pradesh government At the time the 
women’s movement focused on the importance of custodial rape as a specific form of 
male power over women, and the representation of the victim within the criminal 
justice system (Gangoli, 2007). 
 
Unlike the cases in 1980 that were directed against working class and minority 
women, the sexual violence case that triggered a social movement against rape in 
2012-13 was the single incident of the rape and murder of a 23 year old woman 
student, Jyoti Pandey (variously called ‘Damini’ or lightening; or ‘Nirbhaya’ or 
fearless by the press due to legal restrictions introduced in 1893 on divulging the 
name of a victim of rape, see section II) on a bus in Delhi. The student and her male 
companion were attacked with iron rods by the six men who were driving around the 
city on a private bus. The driver stopped to pick up the pair, who thought it was a 
regular public transport vehicle. The woman was attacked with iron rods and gang 
raped, while the bus drove through a series of police checkpoints over several hours. 
Her companion was beaten and, subsequently, the men stripped the pair and dumped 
them by the side of the road. She died from her injuries on 26
th
 December 2012, 
marking a sombre end to the year. 
 
The public response to this incident has been complex and hybrid, and unlike the 
1980s, not primarily restricted to the feminist movement. On the one hand, there have 
been seeming spontaneous vigils against sexual violence by university students in 
universities in Delhi and elsewhere, where young women are claiming their right to 
live a life of dignity in the public sphere, free from the fear of sexual violence. The 
incident of rape became a focal point for a social movement on the wider issue of the 
safety of women in public spaces, including sexual harassment and other forms of 
sexual violence. On the other hand, the case has led to MPs and politicians voicing 
misogynist views. For instance, Congress Parliament member Abhijit Mukherjee 
dismissed protesters against the rape as "dented and painted women", or middle class 
women who have no knowledge of Indian ‘realities’ frequent discos, and are taking 
part in candlelight vigils because they are fashionable. Moreover, Samajwadi Party 
leader Abu Azmi and RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat's believed that rapes are mostly 
urban phenomenon, linked to westernisation and women wearing “less clothes” and 
that urban women needed to protect themselves by staying at home, and should only 
venture out of the home whilst chaperoned by  male relatives.  
 Such views reflect patriarchal fears and anxieties about the women’s bodies in the 
context of globalisation. It has also been argued that civil society focus on an urban 
incident of rape of a student – therefore representing an aspirational upper middle 
class (even though Jyoti Pandey herself was from a working class/lower middle class 
family) – detracted from the endemic nature of sexual violence experienced by 
working class, rural and Dalit women; and more generally, on all women in the 
context of their home, and marriage (c.f. Gangoli, 2013).   
 
As in the 1980s, the social movement in 2012-13 also focused on the relatively rarer 
cases of ‘stranger rape’ rather than marital or familial rapes, even though feminists 
used the incidents to draw attention to the latter. At both points in history, social 
movements called for rapid changes to the rape law. In 2013, demands range from the 
rational – speedy disposal of rape cases, abolition of the two finger test - to the 
controversial – death sentences for rapists – to the ludicrous – chemical castration for 
men convicted in rape cases (Gangoli and Rew, 2013). 
 
Section II  
The 1980s: The Law Commission and Law making on rape 
 
In April 1980, the Law Commission of India published its report on rape. This was 
followed by a bill in August 1980 in the Lok Sabha that suggested major amendments 
to the rape law, which was then referred to a Joint Committee comprising of 
representatives from both houses of Parliament, and various ministries. After 44 
sittings, the report was tabled in the Lok Sabha on November 2nd, 1982 – two years 
after the bill was first introduced in Parliament (Joint Committee 1982).  
 
 
There were various iterations to the bill between these stages; this paper is primarily 
concerned with how the Law Commission Report was variously interpreted and 
translated by the Parliament before becoming law in 1983. The Law Commission 
report (1980) considered not only the reference made by the government, but also 
consulted a range of women’s organisations, and interested Members of Parliament.  
 
On the one hand, it has a well articulated feminist understanding of rape, for instance 
arguing that rape is the ‘ultimate violation of the self’, and focusing on the way in 
which rape victims are further victimised by the criminal justice system. The Law 
Commission also recommended the concept of ‘custodial rape’, again a feminist 
demand– for instance, where a man has custody over a woman as a police man; or as 
superintendent of an institution – and that perpetrators should be subjected to a greater 
custodial sentence. There was also a discussion of the concept of ‘full and free 
consent’, and the Commission accepted that violence was not necessary in rape, and 
that silence did not automatically mean consent: 
 
Under the amendment as recommended, it would not be open to the Court to 
draw an inference of consent on the part of the woman from her silence due to 
timidity or meekness… (page 6). 
 
In line with feminist concerns, the Commission also recommended that the victim’s 
past sexual history not be used by the prosecution in rape trials as a way of 
discrediting the woman’s testimony. 
 
On the other hand, the Law Commission only partially interpreted rape as an abuse of 
male power over women. Therefore, the report uses the term ‘forcible rape’, which 
can be seen as a contradiction in terms, as all rapes by definition are forced. Feminist 
demands that marital rape be criminalised was also accepted in part, therefore the 
recommendation made was that rape within marriage be criminalised only under some 
situations, for example, in the case of judicial separation, and child marriage. 
Contrary to feminist demands, the Law Commission recommended that rape trials be 
conducted in camera, and that restrictions on identifying the victim be placed on the 
press. While this was aimed at protecting rape victims from further embarrassment, as 
‘certain details of an intimate character may have to be narrated in court’, we have 
argued elsewhere that rather than seeing rape as an abuse of male power, this further 
underscores a patriarchal association of rape with shame and loss of honour (Gangoli, 
2007; 2011). Further, arguably the Mathura rape case could not have become a focus 
of feminist and public inquiry had such press restrictions been applied at the time, and 
as we saw in Section I, this led to the press using pseudonyms in rape cases in later 
cases including the 2012 case.  
 
The Bill introduced in August 1980 had the following clauses. First, an amendment 
was made to Section 228 IPC that prohibited press coverage of any incident of rape, 
or any publicity that revealed the name of the offender or the victim, and the insertion 
of Section 228A that mandated that rape cases be conducted ‘in camera’, therefore 
they would not be subjected to and open to public scrutiny and attendance. Second, 
Section 375 was introduced in the IPC, redefining consent in rape cases as sexual 
intercourse by a man with a woman ‘without her free and voluntary consent’. Section 
375 also stated that the marital rape exemption would not be applicable in cases of 
judicial separation, therefore creating to a partial expansion of the category of marital 
rape in Indian rape law. Finally, Section 376 IPC was introduced, which created a 
new category of rape, i.e. rape by members of the police within their official 
jurisdiction, by public servants, by superintendents or managers of jails, remand 
homes and hospitals, on women under their custody. Gang rape was included within 
this category of aggravated rape, and all these categories attracted longer custodial 
sentences than other forms of rape. Significantly, under Section 376, the onus of proof 
was shifted from the defendant to the accused. That is, ‘if the woman stated that she 
did not consent, the court would presume that she did not consent’(Bill No. 162, cited 
in Gangoli, 2007).  
 
The Joint Committee report supported the concerns of some feminist groups, that 
Section 228 and 228 A would prevent women’s organisations from protesting against 
rape judgements and rape cases, as this could potentially identify both victim and 
offender, and that it would lead to an indirect form of press censorship (FAOW 1980, 
1-2). Therefore the report recommended that under certain circumstances, publicity 
may be ‘necessary for proper investigation’; therefore that publicity be permitted if 
the victim desired it, or it was in the interests of the case (Joint Committee 1982, 6-7). 
 
In further agreement with feminist concerns, the Committee suggested that provisions 
regarding rapes by policemen be strengthened, that Section 376 be extended to all the 
staff of a jail, not merely the supervisory staff; that rapes in hospitals be extended to 
include visitors, as well as patients, that rape of minors be included under this section 
and that the rape of a physically and mentally disabled woman be brought within 
Section 376 (Joint Committee 1982, 9-11).  
 
However, on the issue of marital rape, the Committee took a somewhat conservative 
stand, suggesting that in the case of judicial separation, ‘there is a possibility of 
reconciliation until the decree of divorce is granted, therefore non consensual sex 
between a judicially separated couple not be treated as rape’(Joint Committee 1982, 
8-9). However the 1983 law did criminalise non consensual sex between judicially 
separated couples, marking a partial victory for feminists in their battle to criminalise 
marital rape. 
 
 
It was also considered that the rape of a minor girl within marriage was a less serious 
offense than other forms child rape . In a note of dissent accompanying the 
recommendations, a member of the Committee, MP L.K. Advani opposed the 
provision criminalising the rape of a minor by her husband, on the ground that rape 
within marriage should not be recognised under any circumstance 
The Commission’s concerns and Advani’s intervention in this debate exposes some of 
the anxieties felt by conservative forces about feminist interventions. Allowing 
marital rape to be criminalised, even in the limited area of child marriage and judicial 
separation was construed as a threat to the institution of marriage , which was 
constructed as based on the undisputed sexual rights of men over women within 
marriage. In contrast, feminists have argued that the socially sanctioned sexualisation 
of a girl in cases of child marriage is the most reprehensible aspect of child marriage, 
and that children cannot legally consent to marriage, or to sexual activities. Outtara et 
al (2010) argue that: ‘child marriage must be understood as a situation of danger for 
girls, characterised by widespread rape and a life of servility (pp.30). Therefore, far 
from being treated as an exception,sexual abuse of children within marriage should be 
punished more severely than other forms of sexual abuse, rather than as less severely 
(Outtara et al. 2010; Mikhail, 2010).  We can therefore see a tension in the way in 
which feminist understandings are conceptualized and transalated by the law 
commission and MPs. 
The Joint Committee made several general recommendations for the bill. The 
committee suggested that the right to private defense extended to causing death be 
given to a woman on molestation, as on rape. In addition, to safeguard women’s 
safety, women should not be arrested after sunset and before sunrise; that medical 
examination of the accused, and of the complainant be done immediately on 
complaint, that social welfare officials be associated in the procedures; that 
compensation be given to rape victims to compensate for social ostracism. Many of 
these suggestions are based on rape myths. As we have seen in Maya Tyagi’s case, 
women’s safety cannot be guaranteed by not arresting women at night, and the 
suggestion merely reinforces the notion that rape takes place only at the dead of night, 
and that women’s safety is guaranteed within the home. Ludicrous in itself, the idea 
can also contribute to disbelief in cases when the incidents of rape do take place at 
other times and in other places. The Joint Committee report also did not take into 
cognisance the recommendations of the Law Commission, and of women’s 
organisations that the past sexual history of the woman not be adduced in the 
evidence, or during cross examination, therefore feeding into rape myths of women’s 
chastity being linked to their reliability as witnesses in rape trials 
However, both the Law Commission and Joint Committee Report seemed to be 
influenced in part by feminist rhetoric, and concerns. This can be seen in contrast to 
the Lok Sabha Debates, where feminist principles are acknowledged in a tokenistic 
manner, and there was concern that women’s organisations had gone too far in some 
of their demands. One MP referred to an appeal made to the Delhi High Court to 
review a rape case in which the accused had been acquitted, followed by 
demonstrations outside the Court, which was seen as not ‘consistent with the rule of 
law’ (Shri Ram Jethmalani Lok Sabha Debates 1983, cited in Gangoli, 2007). The 
fear that feminists go too far in some demands was something of a refrain during the 
debates, most evident in the debates around criminalisng marital rape, in general 
which is seen as conceptually against Indian culture Gangoli, 2007). 
 
In a similar vein, it was argued that if child marriages were not prevented by law 
enforcers, it was ‘absurd’ to stop men from exercising their ‘conjugal rights’ within 
these marriages, and to expect the husband to become a ‘hermit’ (Shri Ram 
Jethmalani, Lok Sabha Debates 1983c, 415, translated from Hindi). Following 
Freeman, we can see that feminist concerns around ending marital rape was watered 
down by the Law Commission, and the Joint Committee, and this partial translation 
was further questioned by the MPs during discussion at the legislative stage. The rape 
law amendment in 1983 criminalised non consensual sex between judicially separated 
couples, and within marriage where the wife was under 15 years of age. We can trace 
this imperfect translation as a form of misogynist rejection of key feminist principles. 
Clearly, in this articulation, male and patriarchal power is manifest. 
 
The feminist proposal adopted by the Law Commission, that the past sexual history of 
the woman be disregarded during the trial was opposed as another unreasonable 
feminist demand and it was feared that if it was accepted, false cases of rape would be 
filed by women, especially ‘some women who, unfortunately, do not conform to the 
normal standards of womenhood’ against rich and powerful men to malign them, 
perhaps at the behest of the police (Lok Sabha Debates 1983b, 431).  
Many of the suggestions put forward by the Law Commission and the women’s 
organisations were not taken up or included in the law. This included the suggestion 
to include rapes due to economic domination under Section 375; to regulate or do 
away with Section 228 A, to increase the role of women’s organisations in rape cases; 
to shift the onus of proof to the accused in all rape cases.  
 
As a whole, the 1980 legislative debates reveal some patterns. One, that feminist 
interventions and rhetoric had permeated in different ways within policy and law 
making, both in the Law Commission, and to a lesser extent in the 1983 amendment. 
However, the understanding was most often incomplete, and reflected a failure to 
draw linkages between sexual violence and other forms of gender and social 
inequalities. This sometimes led to strange formulations. For instance, if a critique of 
son preference and discrimination against daughters is missing, early marriage of 
daughters is not a cause for concern in itself. If women are seen as ‘belonging’ to their 
husbands, marital rape remains an oxymoron. If we see the legislative process as a 
microcosm of society, we can see that the process of translation of feminist critiques 
of male power become more and more diluted during its travel from the Law 
Commission to the Lok Sabha debates to the law. The law in 1983 was very different 
from some if not most feminist concerns, however there was, within the Law 
Commission and the Joint Committee, a sense that they were aligned partly to 
feminist interpretations of sexual violence and rape.The rape law amendment of 1980 
remained an uneasy  amalgam of feminist concerns interpreted and translated 
(Freeman, 2009) by the Law Commission, and then reinterpreted by the Lok Sabha 
and the Parliamentary Joint Committee. While some feminist concerns, such as 
marital rape and custodial rape were articulated and included as a way to legitimise 
parliamentary processes, others, such as proscribing the provision for using the 
woman’s past sexual history in court in the judicial process were not included. 
However, we agree with Agnes (1993) that the campaign and the amendment could 
not succeed in “evolving a new definition of rape beyond the parameters of ...notions 
of chastity, virginity, premium on marriage and fear of female sexuality”, and we 
suggest that this owes to the power dynamics within the law making process, where 
feminist articulations and rhetoric remain marginalised.  
 
Section III  
2013: The Verma Commission and law making on rape 
 
 
As noted above, Following Jyoti Pandey’s rape case, a committee made up of Justice 
J.S. Verma, Justice Leila Seth (both retired judges) and Gopal Subramanium was 
constituted by the Government to look into possible amendments to the Criminal 
Justice Law ‘to provide for quicker trial and enhanced punishment for criminals 
committing sexual assault of extreme nature against women’. The report (henceforth 
Justice Verma Committee report) was submitted to the Prime Minister within thirty 
days, and unlike the amendments in the 1980s, the rape law amendments in 2013 took 
less than a few days after to be passed into law through an emergency ordinance, 
turning the entire process of law making into what Baxi has rightly called a ‘judicial 
spectacle’ (Baxi, 2013).  
 
The Justice Verma Committee report claims its legitimacy from the civil society 
movement, and tellingly the opening lines of the 631 pages long report referencing 
‘the countrywide peaceful public outcry of civil society, against the failure of 
governance to provide a safe and dignified environment for the women of India, who 
are constantly exposed to sexual violence’ (page i). The first chapter of the report 
draws on constitutional guidelines as well as developmental literature, notably 
Amartya Sen’s ideas of sustainability, and the second chapter addresses gender justice 
and India’s obligations under international conventions. A number of stakeholders 
were consulted including feminist groups, legal experts, medical professionals, 
academics. 
 
The report acknowledges the long standing role of the women’s movement, and the 
generalised misogyny and victim blaming within the parliament, and argues, in line 
with feminist principles, that, ‘the right to be protected from sexual harassment and 
sexual assault is...guaranteed by the constitution, and is one of the pillars on which the 
very construct of gender justice stands’ (page 2). Further, it points out that the legal 
and social focus on stigma and shame in rape cases has the counter effect of 
reiterating the stigma for the victim, adding that rape is an issue of ‘bodily integrity’ 
(page 94) for the woman, rather than against the woman’s family or the wider 
community. 
 The report had a very clear understanding of ‘everyday’ rape and sexual assault as a 
form of male violence against women and men, adding that the specific gendered 
aspect of rape should not be diluted by making the act gender neutral, and the term 
‘rape’ as opposed to ‘sexual assault be used because of a shared understanding of the 
term in the Indian context’. It also recommended that the offence of rape be redefined 
to include non consensual penetration to go beyond penile penetration into the vagina 
as in the older law on rape. An offense of sexual assault was suggested to include non 
penetrative sexual touching. It also recommended that marital rape be criminalised, 
stating that the marital rape exemption violated the fundamental objectives of the 
Convention on Human Rights, the ‘very essence of which is human rights, dignity and 
freedom’ (page 114), thus marking a clear departure from earlier legal impunity  to 
marital rape in India.  In essence, in ‘everyday’ acts of rape and sexual assault, the 
perpetrator could only be a man, though victims could be both women and men, 
However, the report did not recommend that Section 377 IPC that criminalises 
‘unnatural sex’ or consensual and non consensual sex between men be repealed, This 
has been noted as contradictory by some feminist commentators (Baxi, 2013), as it 
retains the problematic criminalising of some kinds of consensual sexual activities, 
that are against heteronormativity. 
 
The report reiterated the importance of speedy justice in rape and sexual assault cases, 
and a gradation of the offense of rape, where cases of gang rape, or where the victim 
is in the custody if people in authority, such as the police and armed forces were 
treated as more serious, and therefore to be dispatched speedily through the criminal 
justice system. Interesting in these cases, the recommendation was that the perpetrator 
was not gender specific but could be either woman or man, as the victim. The report 
also recommended that the controversial ‘two finger test’ for survivors of rape by 
doctors should no longer be used in rape cases. This test allows doctors to insert two 
fingers into the raped woman’s vagina to figure out whether the hymen is distensible 
or not. This then leads to the inference that the rape survivor is habituated to sex, 
introducing past sexual history into rape trials. The report has a detailed and chapter 
that recommends sensitive procedures and guidelines for medical practitioners in rape 
and sexual assault cases, within a Sexual Assault Crisis Centre (in line with 
developments in the UK and Canada). Along with recommending that age, injuries, 
medical conditions and other individual particulars are taken into account, the report 
states categorically that, ‘the issue of whether sexual assault occurred is a legal issue 
and not a material diagnosis. Consequently, doctors should not, on the basis of the 
medical examination, conclude whether rape had occurred or not’ (page 274: 
emphasis in original). This eludes also, to the prior use of medical ‘evidence’ to 
determine whether the woman was habituated to sexual intercourse, and therefore a 
likely victim.  Arguably, the two finger test aimed at ascertaining previous sexual 
history negates the amendment passed in 2000 that a woman’s previous sexual history 
should not used as evidence in court during trial. 
 
The actual law was passed only days after the submission of the report,  through an 
emergency ordinance, and the ordinance has been criticised by feminists, both due to 
its content, but also because of the manner in which due democratic process appears 
to have been bypassed. It is not possible in 2013 to note the continuities and changes, 
and the linguistic translations through legislative process and discussions, in stark 
contrast to 1983, where discussions and debates on the law took place over three 
years. 
 
There were a number of dichotomies between the report in 2013 and the ordinance. 
The ordinance retained the marital rape exemption; therefore continuing to place 
women in violent and abusive marriages unable to access the law when raped by 
intimates. Whilst the Justice Verma Commission defined the offence of rape in 
specific gendered terms (with male perpetrators), the law conceptualised it as as a 
gender neutral offense, for both perpetrators and victims, in ‘everyday contexts’ as 
well as the aggravated rape cases (e.g gang rape and custodial rape cases). Unlike the 
report, the ordinance did not define sexual assault (non consensual and non penile 
penetration into bodily orifices) as having any gradations, as to its severity, nature or 
impact. The ordinance also retains the two finger test,  critiqued by the report - 
therefore continuing historical injustices in rape cases and trials, and perpetuating 
rape myths. 
On the other hand, there were some similarity between the ordinance and the report. 
Both enabled the setting up of speedy trials in some cases of rape. Neither challenged 
the criminalisation of consensual gay sex (Section 377 IPC). What is significant here, 
in our view, is that gender neutrality allows women to be charged with rape offences 
by men, and could potentially be used as counter accusations in marital disputes. 
Also, gay men could be charged with both ‘unnatural sex’ under Section 377 IPC, and 
with rape under the sexual offences act. 
 
The Justice Verma Commission report was more in line with social movement 
rhetoric, particularly feminist politics and conceptualization as compared to the 1980 
Law Commission. However, there were gaps between the recommendations of the 
Verma Commission report and the law. The translation of feminist politics into law 
continues to be incomplete. 
 
 
Section IV  
Conclusions: feminist engagement and continuities in the Law Commission  
 
As we have seen, feminist interventions played an important role in affecting law 
commission reports on rape and sexual violence. This has been the case both in 1980 
and 2013, where both reports drew on feminist rhetoric and arguments to bolster and 
strengthen their case. The 2013 report is much more detailed, and draws on a range of 
related influences (developmental, human rights) though the voice and influence of 
the women’s movements remains predominant.  
 
However in both cases, we see that the translation from feminist politics to law 
commission to law is complex and the interpretation of feminist principles remain 
partial. This is more so in the 1980s than in 2013. For instance, feminist demands in 
the 1980‘s on the treatment of custodial rape as an aggravated form of sexual 
violence, where the burden of proof is shifted from the victim to the accused led to an 
inversion of the innocent until proven guilty principle and in 2013 social movement 
demands for a speedy resolution on the Jyoti Singh case led to the setting up of 
special courts, the judicial wisdom of both  remain controversial. It can be argued that 
both these provisions may have created a precedent wherein human rights principles 
of fair trial and due consideration of rights of the accused are undermined. 
  
The speed at which the Law Commission’s 2013 report became law through an 
emergency ordinance showed how translation in this instance was primarily a political 
process resulting both from  the wish of the ruling party, Congress to show political 
strength for an upcoming election, and as a result of the unprecedented level of social 
protest that occurred immediately after the rape. Consequently, calls for ‘justice‘, 
mediated through the symbol of Nirbhaya, resulted in legal resolutions which 
compromised key feminist interests and concerns, primarily over the construction of 
rape and sexual assault as gender neutral,  the failure to criminalise marital rape and 
the retention of the two finger test    
 
In this regard, there were definite continuities between the 1980s and 2013 in the 
manner in which feminist concepts of rape were excluded from the process of legal 
translation. In particular, the exclusion of marital rape as a criminal offense from the 
emergency ordinance, despite it being recommended by the 2013 Justice Verma Law 
Commission Report, maintains the idea that rape is essentially a crime perpetrated by 
‘strangers’ and dismisses the fact that rape is, as is well known, a crime 
overwhelming committed by someone the victim knows from their immediately 
family, wider relatives, or friends. For instance, the National Family Health Survey of 
India (2006) NFHS-3 found that ever married women in India experiencing sexual 
violence were most likely to experience sexual violence from their husbands than any 
other male (over 90%), and never married women who have experienced sexual 
violence have most often been abused by a relative (27 percent), a friend/acquaintance 
(23 percent), a family friend (8 percent), a boyfriend (19 percent) than a stranger (16 
percent), Consequently, the patriarchal basis of the ‘Indian family‘, where the women 
is understood to be the sexual property of the husband, goes fundamentally 
unchallenged. Why this exclusion occurred needs further investigation, but we can 
surmise that following Freeman, this reflected the victory of patriarchal power 
manifested by the parliamentary process over feminist challenges to male privilege 
within Indian marriages.     
Similarly the failure to abolish the two finger test, which as noted above makes a 
mockery of the amendment following the 2000 law amendment that proscribed the 
use of the woman’s sexual history also raises concerns about the way the rape victim 
continues to be constructed in law as a woman who needs to prove her chastity. In 
spite of the gender neutrality of the new law, the victim continues to be cast as a 
woman, and it remains to be seen how male victims of sexual violence will be treated 
by the law, and indeed the judicial process. 
 
This rather dismal picture appears to feed into the very valid critiques made by some 
feminists about the impossibility of justice in law, primarily Carol Smart’s well 
known statement that: “in accepting law’s terms in order to challenge law, feminism 
always concedes too much” (Smart 1989, 5) and Nivedita Menon’s warning (2004) 
that any appeals from feminists to democracy, equality, and justice through the law, 
may have reached their discursive limits. We do acknowledge that the law making 
process, whether reflected in the Law Commissions or the legislative process, may 
translate feminist interventions and conceptualisation in a way that is unrecognisable 
to feminist politics. Further, the law making process appears to draw legitimacy from, 
but is constant conflict with feminism.   
 
However, we argue that the law making process remains important, and feminist 
disengagement with this process is untenable, as the impact and importance of law in 
women’s lives is undisputable. Carol Smart in her later work also noted “how law 
influences our personal lives” and “how and why we often turn to law for solutions 
to personal dilemmas” (cited in Auchmuty, & Van Marle, 2012 ). Certainly in the 
area of sexual violence, women often cannot avoid an engagement with the criminal 
justice system, and where they may have a choice (for example in the case of 
intimate partner sexual violence), surely an important part of feminist intervention 
has to include expanding, and making real women’s choices.  
 
Elsewhere, we have argued that in India, as elsewhere, feminists engage in multiple 
and hybrid strategies against gender based violence, and patriarchal dominance 
(Gangoli and Rew, 2014). Whilst engaging with law making bodies, such as the Law 
Commission and the Parliament in particular, and the criminal justice system in 
general, may be a particularly frustrating area of intervention, and appear to remain 
impervious to feminist intervention; we argue that it is an important area of 
intervention, when accompanied as it is, by other forms of community and wider 
activist work. 
 
As long as feminists continue to engage with the law - which we continue to believe 
is a worthwhile project in conjunction with other forms of social activism  - working 
with Law Commissions to reform laws on gender violence remains an important area 
of work.  
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